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Abstract
TCP/IP fingerprinting is a common technique used to detect unique network stack characteristics of an
Operating System (OS). Its usage for network compromise is renowned for performing host discovery and in
aiding the blackhat to determine a tailored exploit of detected OSs. The honeyd honeynet is able to
countermeasure blackhats utilising TCP/IP fingerprinting via host device emulation on a virtual network.
Honeyd allows the creation of host personalities that respond to network stack fingerprinting as a real
network would. The nature of this technique however, has shown to provide inconsistent and unreliable
results when performed over wired and wireless network mediums. This paper presents ongoing research
into the TCP/IP fingerprinting capabilities of the popular host discovery tool Network Mapper (NMAP) on
the honeyd honeynet. The forensic analysis of raw packet-captures allowed the researcher to identify
differences in the modus operandi and outcomes of fingerprinting over the two mediums. The results of this
exploratory study show the process of discovery to uncover how TCP/IP fingerprinting with NMAP and
honeyd needs to be tested for effective network countermeasure.
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INTRODUCTION
TCP/IP fingerprinting is a scanning technique that can be used by network administrators to assess their
network in addition to blackhats identifying victims to exploit. The fingerprinting technique itself involves
determining any unique differences between Operating Systems (OS) and distinguishing the feature in
network packets so that it may be probed (Yarochkin, 1997). An OS fingerprint should have a distinctive
identification, that when recognised, reveals the platform name and version such as Microsoft Windows XP
SP2.
Network Mapper (NMAP) (Yarochkin, 2004c) is a tool that contains a database of known and previously
tested fingerprints by the online security community. Each fingerprint belongs to a specific OS platform that
is assigned a signature, which usually is identical to the actual OS name. The fingerprints themselves show
a series of TCP/IP probing packet sequences that are sent from the probing OS to the network stack of the
probed OS. Probing packets contain flag settings, which are changed according to the type of probe that is
sent. There is an extensive list of probes that may be sent by NMAP, mostly malformed TCP/IP packets,
which aids a clandestine approach to conducting scans.
NMAP is primarily used to determine the OS running on a selected IP address. This exercise is commonly
referred to as host discovery and NMAP performs this through sending probing packets to the specified
ports on the OS of the target IP selected. The host name that is discovered should correspond to a signature
in the NMAP database if it is known. NMAP can detect the types of services and applications that are
running on the ports that it scans. Consequently, a host discovery technique that may be fine-tuned using a
variety of probes aids to paint a full picture of the OS that is running on the IP of a target (Wolfgang, 2002).
As the tool is freely downloadable from the World Wide Web (WWW) and highly flexible in its use, it has
become a popular choice for administrators to use in addition to blackhats of various levels of sophistication
(Conry-Murray, 2003; Spitzner, 2003; Yarochkin, 1997, 2002).
The fingerprints in NMAP’s database are tested and contributed by the security community, and maintained
by the original author Fyodor Yarochkin. When they are submitted to the database, they are tested by
several parties on unknown machines and OSs. A limitation that may arise is that the fingerprint may only
be effective for host discovery when performed from a specific platform OS or OSs. Consequently, when a
newly released OS is used to perform TCP/ IP fingerprinting, the results may not be consistently the same.

Proceedings of 3rd Australian Computer, Network & Information Forensics Conference

Page 115

One method for testing if NMAP can effectively fingerprint all the OS signatures in it’s database is by
configuring the honeyd (Provos, 2005) honeynet with all the signatures. A honeypot or honeynet is any
digital entity which behaves as a genuine resource when probed or attacked (Spitzner, 2003; The Honeynet
Project, 2004). The purpose of a honeypot or a honeynet, which is a network of honeypots, is to employ the
characteristics of the resource it is mimicking to deceive the blackhat. Honeyd is a daemon, which creates
host devices or a virtual network of devices by emulating lower layer protocols such as TCP, IP, UDP, and
ICMP as examples, in addition to upper-layer protocols including FTP, TELNET, and HTTP as part of an
OS’s personality.
Honeyd was designed to countermeasure NMAP’s fingerprinting ability, utilised by blackhats, by
employing its own techniques against itself. The virtual hosts and networks are configured through
templates that assign NMAP signatures to an assigned IP address. Honeyd can create many thousands of
hosts, with a personality that includes services, applications, and protocol instructions for each or any
specific port. For example, ports on a host may be configured to accept, drop or tarpit (prolong a connection
for an inevitable time) connection attempts initiated by the probing packets sent by the blackhat.
When a blackhat sends probing packets from NMAP to honeyd they may believe they are attacking a real
network of OSs because the responses that honeyd generates are identical to a real OS. This deceptive
capability may act as a network countermeasure for administrators attempting to prevent blackhats from
reaching the corporate network. In addition to this, the honeyd honeynet may act as a decoy to distract the
blackhat while the administrator monitors their methods and identifies the goal of their endeavour.
However, the effectiveness of honeyd to deceive network attackers is limited to its ability to mimic the
network stack of its configured hosts.

PREVIOUS STUDIES USING HONEYD TO COUNTERMEASURE NETWORK
ATTACK
In addition to the literature on the deceptive capabilities of honeyd and honeynets for decoying blackhats
from genuine systems and monitoring their activities when in the honeynet, studies by Gupta (2003)
presented results on the effectiveness of using honeyd as a network countermeasure. At the time, the
honeynet utilised a Linux Redhat 7.3 installation and honeyd version 0.4a with subsequent upgrade to 0.5a
to construct the deceptive network that was tested by voluntary participants of the study with network
attacking skills.
Cyclical experiments were conducted where the honeynet was subject to network penetration testing by
voluntary blackhat participants, and then upon feedback the honeynet was reconfigured to appear and
behave more securely. Three rounds of testing were conducted. The blackhats concluded that the initial
honeynet appeared to be unsecured and weakly configured and network logging showed high levels of
network (TCP, ICMP, UDP) traffic. By the third round, the blackhats reported that the network appeared to
be a well-configured corporate implementation allowing controlled levels of network traffic. These results
indicated that the honeyd was effective in deceiving the blackhat while network logging allowed the
researcher to monitor their activities while in the honeynet.
Subsequent research by Valli (2003) investigated how honeyd could be improved to deceive the blackhat. It
was deduced that the TCP/IP fingerprinting capabilities of NMAP against honeyd was one of the crucial
factors contributing to the blackhat’s deception. Also using Linux Redhat 7.3 as the base testing OS and the
then current honeyd version of 0.7a, Valli tested all possible NMAP signatures to determine which could be
fingerprinted across five separate scan-types over a wired medium. The results showed that of the possible
704 signatures, only 152 could effectively fingerprint.
The study utilised five of NMAP’s probes, SYN, FIN, UDP, NULL, and XMAS, which are explained as
follows. The Synchronise (SYN) flag set in a packet that is usually sent to initiate a TCP connection. The
Finish (FIN) flag set in a packet is sent to tear down or terminate a TCP connection. The User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) utilises a flag set for a connectionless packet. The Null (NULL) flag has no flags enabled in
the packet; and the Christmas Tree (XMAS) flag enables a combination of the FIN, Urgent Pointer (URG)
and PUSH flags in a TCP packet. The URG flag indicates the packet requires urgent attention and is usually
for TELNET connections. The PUSH flag indicates not to wait before sending data.
Each of the probes form part of a scan-type, which implements the flag settings in a series of packets sent to
a target machine. NMAP interprets the response given by it’s target. A sophisticated user of NMAP may
identify with the types of responses that are produced from the scans. For example, a NULL scan-type that
yields a Reset (RST) response is most likely a Microsoft Windows OS (Yarochkin, 2004b).
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Of the 152 successful fingerprints, several were chosen to configure a wireless enabled honeynet using
honeyd version 0.8b on a Linux Mandrake 9.0 installation (Yek, 2003). The results indicated that the OS
signatures that could be previously fingerprinted over the wired medium did not fingerprint consistently or
reliability over the wireless medium (Yek, 2004). At the time, the network logging facilities afforded by
honeyd proved to be lacking in verbosity to identify the causes of fingerprint failure. The fingerprinting
tools NMAP and Nessus (Deraison, 2005) generated reports on the outcomes of scans and vulnerability
assessment.
While NMAP could not effectively scan all the OS signatures in honeyd, some could be fingerprinted across
the five scan-types previously used by Valli (2003). The network vulnerability assessments performed by
Nessus were mostly able to provide at least one significant weakness for a potential blackhat to exploit. The
overall results showed that the network would not be effective in deceiving a blackhat and countermeasure
network fingerprinting techniques. This study indicated that the TCP/IP fingerprinting of NMAP required
further examination into the causes of failure particularly over the wireless medium and to determine a
method for effective testing.

METHOD
In this research, the honeynet was an Athlon 1.5 GHz desktop machine with a Wireless Network Interface
Card (WNIC) extending an antenna for 802.11b wireless transmission and reception. Additionally, a NIC
allowed for a Category 5 (CAT-5) wired cable to be attached. The exploratory testing was conducted in a
university laboratory.
A minimal installation of Linux Mandrake 10.1 was set up as the base OS for running honeyd version 1.0
(Provos, 2005) – the latest release. Mandrake 10.1 was the latest, robust version released at the time of
configuration. The honeyd had a minimal installation for a reduced number of unneeded utilities, programs,
and software to be running in the background of the honeynet, mitigating insecure programs and allowing
greater processing power for honeyd to run. The attack machine had the same base OS, except a full
installation including NMAP v.3.55 to allow the machine to run uninhibited. The attack machine was a
Pentium III, 800 MHz IBM Thinkpad Laptop which had inbuilt 802.11b wireless capability, which
contained a Hermes chipset to support promiscuous packet capture. The inbuilt card was later replaced (due
to failure) with an Orinoco 802.11b Direct Sequence (DS) Peripheral Connect (PC) card, which operated in
the same promiscuous manner.
The process for testing the TCP/IP fingerprinting was as follows. The NMAP database of OS signatures
were extracted as a text file and configured as hosts in the honeyd templates. The current version of NMAP
contained 988 OS signatures. The hosts imported into the honeyd templates were named host0001 to
host0988. These names held no significance other than representing a sequential numerical order. To
spread out the hosts over a realistic network of addresses, three B class network addresses were used, which
were 172.16.1.1 – 254, 172.16.2.1 – 254, and 172.16.23.1 – 226.
The honeynet machine was given an IP address of 192.168.1.1 on the eth1 interface and the attack
machine was given an IP address of 192.168.1.2 on it’s eth1 interface. The first tests were conducted over
a wired medium using a cross over cable connecting the two machines directly to eliminate any interference
from other networked devices.
On the initial start-up of honeyd with all the hosts loaded, six errors were reported indicating that the six
signatures had inaccuracies, which honeyd could not recognise. These signatures were deleted from honeyd
and honeyd was restarted without error. When honeyd was restarted successfully, the attack machine
initiated the first round of NMAP scanning to determine host name resolution via TCP/IP fingerprinting
over the wired medium, followed by the wireless medium. When the wireless scans were conducted, the
interfaces were changed from eth0 to wlan0 on the honeynet and the attack machines. No other changes
were made to the machines to mitigate the risk of confounding variables affecting the scanning results.

RESULTS OF THE FIRST ROUND OF SCANNING NMAP
For reliability, each scan-type was conducted five times on each IP address. Results showed that if a scantype could fingerprint the OS once, it would do so on the remaining four occasions. The version of NMAP
in use attributed percentage guesses for each OS that it found and ordered them alphabetically. Therefore,
several OSs could be guessed, where one or more could be assigned the highest percentage and numerous
others were assigned a lower percentage. The OS guess was counted as correct if the guess was one of the
highest percentage guesses listed. Figure 1 shows the generated output of an NMAP scan, which found
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several OS matches in it’s fingerprint of 172.16.0.7. The highest percentage score of 90% for the 3Com
Netbuilder Remote Office 222 router was taken as a correct guess.

Warning: OS detection will be MUCH less reliable
because we did not find at least 1 open and 1 closed
TCP port
Interesting ports on 172.16.0.7:
PORT
STATE SERVICE
1/tcp
open tcpmux
2/tcp
open compressnet
3/tcp
open compressnet
...
...
...
61440/tcp open netprowler-manager2
61441/tcp open netprowler-sensor
65301/tcp open pcanywhere
Device type: router|WAP|general purpose|switch
Running (JUST GUESSING) : 3Com embedded (90%), Compaq
embedded (86%), Netgear embedded (86%), Data General
AOS/VS (85%)
Aggressive OS guesses: 3Com Netbuilder Remote Office
222 router (90%), 3Com Netbuilder Remote Office 222
(ESPL-310), Version 10.1 (SW/NBRO-AB,10.1) (90%), 3Com
Netbuilder II Router Ver 11.4.0.51 (88%), 3Com
NetBuilder-II, OS version SW/NB2M-BR-5.1.0.27 (87%),
WAP: Compaq iPAQ Connection Point or Netgear MR814
(86%), AOS/VS on a Data General mainframe (85%), 3Com
SuperStack II switch SW/NBSI-CF,11.1.0.00S38 (85%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions nonideal).
Figure 1 – example NMAP output on scan
Out of the 982 possible OSs in honeyd, NMAP could only resolve six of the signatures and therefore, only
six were effectively fingerprinted, which is shown in Table 1. In Table 1, the hostname and the IP addresses
do not hold significance towards the fingerprinting result. This initial round of scanning was primarily
concerned with determining which OS signatures used on honeyd could be fingerprinted by NMAP
consistently and reliably over the wired and wireless mediums.

Table 1 - NMAP signatures that fingerprinted across all scan-types
HOSTNAME
host0002
host0057
host0070
host0186

IP
172.16.0.2
172.16.0.57
172.16.0.70
172.16.0.186

host0341

172.16.1.87

NMAP SIGNATURE
3Com Access Builder 4000 Switch
Apple Color LaserWriter 600 Printer
Apple Mac OS 8.5.1 (Appleshare IP 6.0)
Cisco 7206 running IOS 11.1(24)
DSL Router: Flowpoint 144/22XX v3.0.8
or SpeedStream 5851 v4.0.5.1
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host0855

172.16.3.93

SCO Open Desktop 2.0

Upon assessing the remaining fingerprint results, 18 more signatures were fingerprinted at least four or
more times over the five scan-types conducted, which is shown in Table 2. The wired and wireless scores
out of five indicate the number of scan-types were successful. host0001, with signature 3Com / USR
TotalSwitch Firmware: 02.02.00R was successfully fingerprinted over three scan-types over the
wire and two scan-types over the wireless medium. For the purpose of this reporting, the type of scan-type
did not matter, as the goal was to fingerprint across all scan-types. However, it was found the SYN scans
were the most successful.

HOST
NAME

IP

host0001 172.16.0.1
host0009 172.16.0.9
host0055 172.16.0.55
host0056 172.16.0.56
host0091 172.16.0.91
host0185 172.16.0.185
host0258 172.16.1.4
host0325 172.16.1.71
host0495 172.16.1.241
host0497 172.16.1.243
host0505 172.16.1.251
host0541 172.16.2.33
host0558 172.16.2.50
host0681 172.16.2.173
host0717 172.16.2.209
host0805 172.16.3.43
host0910 172.16.3.148
host0948 172.16.3.186

NMAP SIGNARURE
3Com / USR TotalSwitch
Firmware: 02.02.00R
3Com NetBuilder-II, OS version
SW/NB2M-BR-5.1.0.27
Apple Color LaserWriter 12/660 PS
(Model No. M3036)
Apple Color LaserWriter 600
Printer
Asante FriendlyNet FR3004 Series
Internet Hub
Cisco 7206 router (IOS 11.1(17)
Compatible Systems (RISC Router,
IntraPort)
D-Link 704P Broadband Gateway
or DI-713P WAP
IBM MVS
IBM MVS TCP/IP TCPMVS 3.2
IBM OS/390 V5R0M0
Lantronix EPS2 print server
Version V3.5/2(970721)
Linksys BEFW11S4 WAP or
BEFSR41 router
Microsoft Windows Server 2003
MultiTech CommPlete Controller
(terminal server)
OpenBSD 3.0-STABLE (X86)
Speedstream 5871 DSL router
Toshiba TR650 ISDN Router

WIRED
/5
WIREL
ESS /5
TOTAL
/10

TABLE 2 - NMAP signatures that fingerprinted four or more times across all scan-types

3

2

5

5

4

9

5

4

9

5

4

9

5

4

9

5

4

9

5

4

9

3

2

5

5
5
5

2
3
4

7
8
9

5

4

9

4

1

5

1

3

4

5

4

9

5
5
5

1
1
4

6
6
9

At this point of testing, the hard disk on the honeyd honeynet failed and a reinstall was required. The new
honeyd that was configured remained as a Linux Mandrake 10.1 installation to maintain consistency;
however, the NMAP signatures had been updated to include over a 1000 in total, which was previously at
988. The attack machine was also modified as the Auditor Security Collection distribution version 20060502-no-ipw2100 which was released and tested by Valli (personal communication, September 5, 2005) to
verify the reliability of the wireless security tools that were part of the distribution OS.
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Further to the changes in the honeynet and attack machine, it was also decided that the testing environment
was unsuitable in a laboratory that was located within an 802.11b wireless saturated location of the
university. Using AiroPeek v.2.0, packet captures of the wireless traffic traversing the attack machine and
honeynet showed a high number of corrupted packets. TCPdump (Network Research Group, 2004) was
used to gather raw network packet captures of the wired and wireless traffic and was viewed through the
network packet analyser Ethereal (Combs, 2004). The comparison between a wired Ethernet header packet
and wireless header packet is shown in Figure 2 and indicates no significant errors at the TCP/IP level of
network packets. The packets shown in Figure 2 are a reflection of the results of TCPdump and it was
deduced that the errors occurring in the TCP/IP fingerprinting might have been at the lower network levels
of the physical and data link.
The new proposed solution was a faraday cage environment, in which a decommissioned stainless steel
cool-room was experimented with; however, the temperature became too hot with the equipment running
and there was no HVAC to circulate the air. The subsequent decision was to build a faraday cage with
inbuilt fans to regulate the heat and temperatures by circulating air out of the cage. A metal cabinet was
utilised, and holes where drilled to allow for minimal cabling and a fan at the top and bottom of the back
wall. The honeynet and packet capture machines were moved into the faraday cage and the attacking laptop
sat on top. When the cage was closed, it was able to keep out external 802.11b wireless traffic while the
antenna reception and transmission was unaffected inside the cage.

Source Port
Destination Port
61493
http (80)
Sequence Number
0
Acknowledgement Number
0
Flags Window
Length
Unused 0x0010
Size
20
ACK
3072
Checksum
Urgent Pointer
0x6b71 (correct)
Not set
Type

Length

Wireless IP header packet from the
attack machine – frame# 13
Figure 2 Comparison of a wired and
wireless network packet

Data

Wired TCP header packet from the
attack machine – frame# 13
Type of
Header
Total
Version
Service
Length
Length
4
Differentiated
20
40
service field
Fragment
Identification
Flags
Offset
0x911a (37146)
0x00
0
Time to Protocol
Header Checksum
Live
TCP
0x8dfa (correct)
(0x06)
46
Source IP Address
192.168.1.2
Destination IP Address
172.16.0.1
Options (if any)
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Several benefits were found when the NMAP scans were retested inside the faraday cage. Firstly, none of the scans took
more than one to two minutes to complete, whereas prior to testing in the cage, some wireless scans took up to 60
hours. It was deduced that the attack machine might have been performing a Denial of Service (DoS) onto the honeynet.
Network packets may have been lost in transmission or bits in the packets may have changed due to the wide area
exposed to the wireless network packets. High numbers of corrupted packets were detected by AiroPeek to support this
theory.
Additionally, the shorter scan times could be attributed to the faraday cage negating the outside wireless transmissions
of the university’s wireless Local Area Network (LAN). Another significant difference was the upgrade of NMAP as
part of using the Auditor distribution OS as the attack machine. NMAP version 3.75 was pre-installed on Auditor and
the subsequent changes included no percentage scores attributed to OS guesses. NMAP now reported all the OSs that it
guessed as most likely and did not report on possible other guesses. These OSs were also organised in alphabetical
order; therefore, if a guess was placed third in the list, it did not indicate it was a third guess. All the guesses had equal
weighting.

RESULTS OF THE SECOND ROUND OF SCANNING NMAP
An odd result that occurred in this round of testing was that the original six OS signatures that fingerprinted
successfully across all scan-types, did not succeed when tested again in the faraday cage. The 18 tentative OS signatures
that tested either four times or more in the laboratory tested more successfully in the cage. Table 3 shows the results of
the testing in the faraday cage. For this testing, all the redundant OS signatures were removed from honeyd, and only
the signatures that were to be tested this time were included in the honeyd configuration file. Consequently, only 24
signatures were incorporated as host01 to host24. The first six OS signatures were those that tested effectively
during the first round of scanning.

Table 3 – NMAP signatures tested in faraday cage

HOST
IP
NAME
host01
host02
host03
host04

172.16.0.1
172.16.0.2
172.16.0.3
172.16.0.4

host05

172.16.0.5

host06

172.16.0.6

host07

172.16.0.7

host08

172.16.0.8

host09

172.16.0.9

host10

172.16.0.10

host11

172.16.0.11

host12

172.16.0.12

host13

172.16.0.13

host14

172.16.0.14

host15
host16
host17

172.16.0.15
172.16.0.16
172.16.0.17

NMAP OS SIGNATURE
3Com Access Builder 4000 Switch
Apple Color LaserWriter 600 Printer
Apple Mac OS 8.5.1 (Appleshare IP 6.0)
Cisco 7206 running IOS 11.1(24)
DSL Router: Flowpoint 144/22XX v3.0.8
or SpeedStream 5851 v4.0.5.1
SCO Open Desktop 2.0
3Com / USR TotalSwitch Firmware:
02.02.00R
3Com NetBuilder-II, OS version
SW/NB2M-BR-5.1.0.27
Apple Color LaserWriter 12/660 PS
(Model No. M3036)
Apple Color LaserWriter 600 Printer
Asante FriendlyNet FR3004 Series
Internet Hub
Cisco 7206 router (IOS 11.1(17)
Compatible Systems (RISC Router,
IntraPort)
D-Link 704P Broadband Gateway or DI713P WAP
IBM MVS
IBM MVS TCP/IP TCPMVS 3.2
IBM OS/390 V5R0M0
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NUMBER
CORRECT
FINGER-PRINTS
/5
5
5
3
2
5
3
0
5
5
5
2
5
5
2
3
2
2
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host18

172.16.0.18

host19

172.16.0.19

host20

172.16.0.20

host21

172.16.0.21

host22
host23
host24

172.16.0.22
172.16.0.23
172.16.0.24

Lantronix EPS2 print server Version
V3.5/2(970721)
Linksys BEFW11S4 WAP or BEFSR41
router
Microsoft Windows Server 2003
MultiTech CommPlete Controller
(terminal server)
OpenBSD 3.0-STABLE (X86)
Speedstream 5871 DSL router
Toshiba TR650 ISDN Router

5
0
2
0
5
5
2

The results show that only three of the original six OS signatures fingerprinted effectively across all five scan-types
conducted. Further testing of the additional 18 showed that eight of the signatures could now fingerprint across all the
scan-types. These results firstly indicated that there was a variation with the NMAP fingerprinting because the first six
should have fingerprinted effectively in the faraday if they could be fingerprinted in an open laboratory with high
interference.
The possible reasons for the discrepancy in results were that NMAP v.3.55 was used for the first round of scans and
during the eight-month period between testing, NMAP v.3.75 was released and pre-installed on Auditor. With each
upgrade of NMAP, changes and improvements are introduced that may modify the scanning results (Yarochkin, 2004a).
This is due to changes in the scanning engine and sometimes, modifications to the fingerprints. This is the most likely
reason that the results differed in the six original fingerprints. An additional possibility is that the Auditor OS was used
as the base OS instead of Linux Mandrake 10.1, as was previously used. This difference is however, less likely to affect
the outcomes as to the change in NMAP itself.
The results that showed more effective results from the faraday testing, that is the remaining 18 OS signatures, indicated
that the testing was also affected by the faraday because some previous signatures that could not fingerprint were
fingerprinting successfully. The NMAP upgrade is also likely to be the reason for their testing success as the database
of OS signatures and fingerprints were expanded and improvements to some scan were made (ibid, 2004a)
From the now eleven available signatures that could fingerprint effectively, it was proposed to design a virtual network
using these signatures to build up OS personalities on eleven network hosts. However, upon closer examination of the
OS signatures, it was found that none was an Access Point (AP) and only the OpenBSD 3.0-STABLE (X86)
signature could act as a server, and none were able to act as clients. Most of the signatures that could be fingerprinted
were routers. Therefore, some additional testing was required so that a more believable network could be designed that
included servers, clients, and an AP.

RESULTS OF SUPPLEMENTARY NMAP SCANNING
The researcher then perused the list of fingerprints for potential OS signatures that could be used to fill out a virtual
network topology. Different OS signatures were chosen based on their believability for existing as part of a network.
For the proposed virtual DMZ, various Solaris, IBM, AIX, FreeBSD and NetBSD fingerprints were tested across the
five scan-types and from these, only FreeBSD and NetBSD could be successfully fingerprinted on all accounts.
Therefore, these OSs were chosen for the DMZ where the personalities could later be incorporated with mail, ftp and
http services.
For client machines, various Microsoft Windows and Apple Macintosh desktop OSs were tested and only Macintosh
signatures appeared to work. According to previous research results, Windows machines do not fingerprint when using
XMAS, UDP and NULL scans over the wireless medium. This has been reported due to Windows responding in a RST
for all these scan-types when no response should be the standard reaction. However, a Windows XP laptop with a
centrino chip was borrowed and tested against NMAP to determine if it could be fingerprinted. The result was that
NMAP was able to fingerprint the Windows laptop across all the scan-types and was able to guess the Windows XP OS
correctly, but among some other OSs as well.
Lastly, serval AP signatures were tested and it was found that a Cisco WGB350 802.11b WorkGroup Bridge
OS signature could fingerprint across all the scan-types effectively. Table 4 shows the additional signatures that were
added to the honeyd virtual network.

Table 4 – Additional NMAP OS signatures
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HOST
NAME
host25
host26
host27
host28
Host29

IP

NMAP OS SIGNATURES

172.16.0.25
172.16.0.26
172.16.0.27
172.16.0.28
192.168.1.13

Cisco WGB350 802.11b WorkGroup Bridge
FreeBSD 5.0-RELEASE
Apple Mac OS 7.1
NetBSD 1.6
Windows XP SP2

Figure 3 – Proposed honeyd network topology
The proposed virtual network of host devices including Macintosh clients, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD servers and a
mix of networking mechanisms including an AP is illustrated in Figure 3. The attack machine is also shown in the
diagram as a laptop using the IP 192.168.1.12 connecting via it’s wireless antenna. This network will be tested with
other network fingerprinting tools such as Xprobe2 (Sys-Security Group, 2003), which functions similarly to NMAP in
an active manner, and p0f (Zalewski, 2004), which is a passive fingerprinting tool that assesses captured network traffic
instead of actively probing the target. It is intended that upon successful TCP/IP fingerprinting, the personalities of each
host will be configured to incorporate services, applications, and routing latency.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Effective TCP/IP fingerprinting is an integral part of deceiving the blackhat when performing host discovery. The
honeyd honeynet implements NMAP’s OS signatures and fingerprints for counteracting network-fingerprinting tools
like NMAP. Ongoing research has shown that the effectiveness of NMAP fingerprinting has varied both over the wired
and wireless mediums, and over varying releases of the each software in use. The best possible way of determining the
best OS emulation in honeyd is to test regularly the NMAP signatures and fingerprints.
This research reported on the results acquired from NMAP primarily as a comparison between wired and wireless
NMAP scans to determine where the problems have arisen. It was found the interference of other wireless activity and
large room space hinders effective physical and data link layer transmission between an attacking machine performing
the fingerprinting against the honeynet machine. It was then decided to test the fingerprinting in a faraday cage to
ascertain differences in results.
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The faraday cage proved more successful results in that 15 OS signatures could be fingerprinted, as opposed to the six
originally tested. This change was attributed to significant upgrades on the NMAP program itself, from v3.55 to 3.75 in
addition to the confining space and walls of the faraday, which allowed transmissions to occur faster and without
interference, resulting in the significantly shorter scanning times.
The outcomes of this research are that NMAP is a continuingly developing program as are honeynet architectures.
However, the implementation of NMAP signatures in honeyd is the most significant change that affects the TCP/IP
fingerprinting ability of the deceptive network. Therefore, effective TCP/IP fingerprinting is more reliant on the
environment in which it is performed, whether there is interference or a far range for signals to travel, in addition to the
version of NMAP used.
A final proposed test is to perform the attacks outside the faraday to determine if honeyd is still able to respond
effectively where there is the outside interference. This testing may illuminate on the honeynet’s ability to deceive in a
potentially live and realistic environment. Interference and uncontrolled signals are realistic obstacles for the blackhat
and are subsequent problems for the defender when attempting to employ deceptive network countermeasure against
TCP/IP fingerprinting. This can be further verified by inviting guest attackers to penetration test the network and
determine if these deceptive mechanisms work on a real blackhat!
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